Japan’s public-relations push toward the U.S. today rests on three echelons of persuasion--the Japanese appointed to handle American opinion; the Americans enlisted to support that effort; and the Japanese who guard the portals of reverse American persuasion toward Japan. Although honorable people--many of them longstanding personal friends--I have come to think of them as the Buffers, the Barnacles, and the Gatekeepers. Insular awkwardness in dealing easily and candidly at all levels with other peoples makes the Japanese unusually dependent on go-betweens. Binational intellectual contacts by the Good Ship Japan are a bit like the ponderous docking of an ocean liner--with padding thrown over the side, barnacles encrusted along the waterline, and checkers on the dock for incoming persons and cargo. The “buffers”--Japan’s own America Handlers--have been widely introduced by Pat Choate in Agents of Influence and by Karel van Wolferen in The Enigma of Japanese Power. The following pages address the other two echelons--the quasi-symbiotic role of America’s America handlers, and the extraordinary difficulty Americans have in conducting any similar Japan handling in Japan.

**Barnacles: America’s America Handlers**

There are many practical institutional and financial aspects to the U.S.’s ineptness in the current dialogue and psychological tug of war with Japan that require attention. The fundamental problem, however, lies in what one might call the sociology of U.S. intellectual focus on Japan. America’s top-drawer intellectual, political and business leaders (unlike Japan’s) have relatively little in-depth knowledge or well-thought-out opinion toward the other country--which makes them vulnerable to both Japanese PR and simplistic Japanophobia. Meanwhile our academic and governmental Japan hands, though often distinguished in their own callings, have little stature on the elite level, speak more to other narrowly based specialists than to the broader public, and are sometimes blinkered in their analytical assessments by a sentimental Japanophilia that comes naturally enough with years of personal friendships and professional investments in that country. In recent times, some academic Japan specialists have also wandered off into the esoteric cul-de-sac of rational choice theory, from whence little realistic or pragmatically useful insight into Japan seems to emerge.
Into this gap between the eminent and the expert the Japanese have now come crashing with extraordinary organizational skill and financial resources, very often enlisting our experts in their wooing of our eminent. There are now in the United States--for the specific purposes of promoting bilateral friendship and a greater understanding of Japan, be they under American, Japanese, or joint sponsorship--tier after tier of cultural, business, civic and grant-making organizations that have no real counterparts doing the same thing for the U.S. in Japan. The Japanese government’s new Global Partnership Program (the so-called Abe Fund), for the exclusive purpose of cultivating American academic, civic and business leaders, was capitalized in April, 1991, at 50 billion yen--about $375 million at that time, and over nine times the size of the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission, our one official agency specifically for cultural and intellectual ties with Japan. (As of September 1991, the dual-specie fund of the Friendship Commission stood at 14.9 million dollars and 3.54 billion yen--a dollar total of about $41.2 million.) The Japanese, too, are all compelled to study English, and are thereby enabled to tune in on and exploit everything we say to each other--one imbalance for which we can only fault ourselves.

One of the cardinal rules of cultural diplomacy is that it is always more effective to allow your host country to do your work for you--to have your history taught by its own colleges and schools, to have your government’s viewpoints carried in the local press as news, to have your national arts promoted by the host country’s own mainstream concert halls and museums. In other words, to get a free ride, rather than trying to make your case directly through PR bulletins and cultural centers controlled and paid for by your own embassy. Japan has no official cultural centers in the U.S., and only three elsewhere in the world--a small one in Jakarta, Indonesia, and two very substantial ones in Rome and Cologne, Germany, that are direct carryovers from the old Axis alliance.

Apart from a series of small, trade-oriented reading rooms in major American cities, Japan’s real cultural diplomacy in the U.S. is carried out by Americans--most promisingly through a rapidly maturing chain of Japan-America Societies now reaching into nearly all of the fifty states. These societies, originally volunteer but increasingly professionalized, now receive program support from the governmental and private sectors of both the U.S. and Japan, and conduct vigorous programs to educate American political, business and media leaders on Japan and the importance of the U.S.-Japan tie.

The preeminent organization, the Japan Society of New York, has long been an aggressive presenter not only of Japan’s culture but also of the Japanese viewpoint generally to the East Coast elite and the U.S. foreign policy establishment. A private American organization established in 1906 but greatly expanded under the aegis of Mr. John D. Rockefeller III after the Second World War, it has an impressive physical plant with a functioning stage, an art gallery, a library and a film collection, and an ongoing program of artistic performances, exhibitions, lectures, seminars and luncheon meetings dealing with the current political and economic scene in Japan, Japanese business methods, trade issues, and U.S.-Japan relations in general. The Society has an accomplished staff of Japan experts to supervise all these activities, and it has become the organizer and starting point for many of the Japanese groups that go on to tour the U.S.--everything from puppet theater to phalanxes of Japanese intellectuals analyzing the causes of economic frictions. Financial
support comes from a lengthy roster of U.S. and Japanese private corporations, but the Japanese government has long viewed the Japan Society as the key partner in its approach to the American public. On the American side, too, the U.S. Information Agency for a number of years contracted to the Japan Society its responsibility for organizing the American subcommittees of the official, biennial intergovernmental U.S.-Japan conference on Cultural and Educational Exchange (CULCON for short, a sort of bilateral watchdog set up in 1962 at the suggestion of American Ambassador Edwin Reischauer).

Since the late 1970s, a large number of other American private-sector organizations have joined the effort to make Japan better known among the American people, notable among them the Japan-America Societies, world affairs councils, and foreign relations groups in major cities of the U.S. other than New York. Many of these organizations work out of small offices and rent hotel space for their public functions, but they are now reaching a significant stratum of American political, business and media leadership nationwide. A national association of the Japan-America Societies was finally established in 1979. Those in major regional centers like Chicago, San Francisco, Boston, and Atlanta have since 1980 dramatically expanded their activities with assistance from the U.S. government’s Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission, a grant-making federal agency established by Congress in 1976 for the purpose of bilateral cultural exchange. To fund these expanded regional programs, the Commission has matched a 1981 Japanese government donation which the Commission originally requested for this purpose.

These smaller Japan Societies still draw heavily for their operations on American volunteers -- on local Asia scholars, retired Japan-hand diplomats, housewives beguiling their time with flower arranging and other Japanese domestic arts, all of them in it mainly for the fun. This represents an extraordinary--and, to date, largely unreciprocated--self-mobilization of Americans to spread the good word about Japan. These Americans have gotten involved out of their own curiosity, public spiritedness, or a concern for the foreign relations of their country. While they view their own role as broadly educational, apolitical, and for the long term, their Japanese co-sponsors (naturally enough) usually have a more immediate and hard-headed agenda--to wit, the expectation that with ever more information, statistics, and explanations in the hands of the U.S. public, trade frictions will evaporate like the mists under the morning sun.

With these unstated, and often unperceived, Japanese agendas piggy-backing on the typical American desire for a more “pragmatic” and “up-to-date” dialogue, these Japan Societies and others like them are rapidly moving away from their original function as narrowly cultural, nostalgia-oriented gatherings for former American residents of Japan, and are now reaching out to the practical world of American businessmen, lawyers, journalists and politicians. Here, one would expect the sheer size and diversity of the United States--as opposed to the compactness and centralization of Japan--to give the Japanese a certain disadvantage in the propaganda game, or if both sides were equally accessible and equally well organized, this geographical difference would of course make the U.S. the more difficult country to manipulate. The Japanese, however, riding smoothly on America’s magnificent social openness, have gradually learned to engage the multicaicentred poles of power and influence throughout the U.S.--once they realized that the country was not
hinged on a Washington-New York-Cambridge axis similar to their own national
hegemon, Tokyo. For Americans, however, Japan’s massive central structures—political,
economic, and cultural—remain tightly protected, while its regional cities and prefectures
pull pathetically little weight.

One further organizational asymmetry is the matter of money—not the opportunity to get it,
but the chance to give it away. Americans and Japanese have very different assumptions
about the implications of gift-giving. We like to imagine the best of other people, Japanese
the worst. Americans can conceive of money without strings tied to it, the Japanese cannot.
For the Japanese gifts always imply a counter-obligation, which is one reason they are so
wary of taking them. So to the extent that their current largesse exceeds the perceived
repayment of earlier American favors, most Japanese would assume the American takers to
be, somehow, in their debt. We believe it is possible to take money from the devil, then
kick him safely out the door. That was how the great American foundations, capitalized by
the tainted gains of robber barons, eventually achieved public respectability. (It was, I
might add, the rubric my own father used, as president of a staid little Presbyterian college,
to dun contributions from Idaho’s legalized slot-machine operators during the lean war
years.)

This was also the axiom by which certain Americans in the early 1980s, after considerable
soul-searching, decided to establish the United States-Japan Foundation with a capital
grant of about $45 million from the right-wing mogul Ryoichi Sasakawa—money derived
from legalized speedboat racing, cleared by the Diet, and closely watched in program
expenditure by the Foreign Ministry.
This foundation, juridically an American organization with a joint U.S.-Japanese advisory
board, has concentrated on the public (as opposed to academic) education of Americans on
Japan, and has funded some innovative projects, including journalist fellowships and a
highly successful exchange of Tokyo and New York City officials and urban
troubleshooters. By 1987-88 its capital base had grown to over $80 million, two to three
times that of the U.S. government’s Friendship Commission. At the outset quite a few
Japanese friends of the U.S. were in doubt as to the wisdom of the American side in taking
this money—Sasakawa, with his open support of right-wing causes and groups, and his
well-researched and substantiated ties to Japanese gangsters, still remains beyond the pale
for most Japanese intellectuals and political liberals. But the Americans convinced
themselves, with their usual insouciance, that—like the Ford Foundation’s or the
Rockefeller Foundation’s largesse—this was sufficiently ‘laundered’ money to make it
acceptable. By 1986, however, the redoubtable Ryoichi Sasakawa (still active today at the
age of 95), had himself decided that his previous donation was too well-disguised; hence
he created back in Japan and more effectively under his personal control the Sasakawa
Peace Foundation, capitalized at one half billion dollars (at 1994 yen-to-dollar exchange
rates) for charitable activities world-wide.

Gatekeepers: No Japan-Handling in Japan

The most critical part of the imbalance, however, lies in Japan itself, where most
Americans would not see it, and where even longtime American residents of that country
have come to take the difficulty of access and the lack of reciprocal organizations as part of the established order of things.

Official U.S. cultural operations in Japan (the USIS American Centers, the Fulbright Program, the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission) are appreciated mainly by a limited clientele of Americanist scholars and others with a professional interest in U.S. arts and culture--for grants, data services, and contacts to American leaders that they can provide. The American Centers are not a force, however, among the intellectual and cultural leadership of Japan as a whole.

The formal bilateral friendship societies in Tokyo and a few other major cities--called America-Japan Societies, and the nominal equivalent of the Japan-America Societies throughout the U.S.--serve little function other than that of monthly luncheon clubs to provide a podium for the occasional American visitor. They do not have dynamic, multi-program operations (like the JAS network) to get American views widely presented to Japan’s national, regional, and local political, business, media, and cultural leaders.

And the same holds true for individual performers. The English-language Japan Times of 3 May 1994 carried--for Western consumption and feedback to the American mainstream--an op-ed piece by a Japanese professor, Yoshihiro Tsurumi of the City University of New York roasting President Clinton who had “demonized Japan” and forced it into “slavish concession.” Nothing unusual about that sort of writing in the U.S.--Americans do it all the time. But what matters here is that we don’t have the reciprocal feature in Tokyo—that is to say, Americans employed at major Japanese universities or other institutions who utilize the Japanese-language media to reach the Japanese people directly with open (let alone sharp or biting) criticism of Japanese leaders and Japanese government policy. It is literally impossible to conceive, for example, of an American (or other foreign) equivalent in Japan of the Indian economist Jagdish Bhagwati at Columbia University, who has led the intellectual attack on Clinton’s Japan policy. He would be yanked, figuratively speaking, out of his chair—that is to say, the anticipated opprobrium would be so great that he would have learned long since not even to contemplate anything so rash.

The same holds true for Japanese television. On the night of 4 May 1994, the NHK nightly op-ed lecture featured a Japanese-speaking American businessman (William Totten, of the Assist Software Co., Tokyo), graphic charts and all, running through what was virtually the standard Government of Japan rebuttal to U.S. trade complaints. As I watched, my immediate reaction was that I wanted equal time--and my next thought was that of course I would never get it. There are no Americans who take the American viewpoint (let aside for the moment who may be right and who may be wrong) into serious television programming, in Japanese. Again, the featuring of a hard-hitting American defense of American views in fluent Japanese on that NHK program would be virtually inconceivable--not because the U.S. talent isn’t there, but because official Japan cannot tolerate an unvarnished foreign challenging of its policies directly before the Japanese public. What Japan’s viewers do get, at best, is a few snippets in English--voiced over in Japanese, and tightly edited in Tokyo--from high-ranking U.S. officials in Washington. A few raspy seconds from Mickey Kantor or Laura Tyson, set against a cliché studio
montage of the White House or Capitol Hill and promptly rebutted by some meticulously prepared Japanese commentator.

There is another, very special, crimp in Japan on the sort of free foreign penetration of local society that is available to the Japanese in America. Once they have found their initial point of entry into the U.S. and know where else they want to go, they are usually free to proceed on their own. The Japanese, however, are uncomfortable with an unfettered, loosely structured multilateralism in dealing with foreign organizations in their own country. Following a custom that applies equally to fellow Japanese, they prefer to have all the business in a given field channeled through a single intermediary Japanese individual or group, sort of a central broker or brokerage known as the madoguchi. This means, literally, a “ticket window,” in effect the gatekeeper.

Foreign individuals or organizations that rely on a particular Japanese entity for their first debut, but then try to dance around with other partners, may quickly find themselves spurned by their original sponsor and effectively shunned by all others. What this does, of course, is to give the gatekeeper a stranglehold on the volume and nature of foreign people, programs, and ideas that he allows to flow through the gate. And since most Japanese organizations particularly those dedicated, if not assigned, to work with the outside world--are hierarchically meshed into other Japanese entities reaching up to the very top of the national policy establishment, few of the Japanese gatekeepers for U.S. cultural ties are likely to stray any great distance from the official consensus. That is not to imply, of course, that many of the gatekeepers do not work extremely hard and enthusiastically on behalf of their American clients (who would be lost without them), within the limits permitted by Japan’s heavily compartmentalized and personalized social order.

There are, to be sure, a growing number of Japanese universities, corporations, media organizations and small foundations which run their own exchanges with individuals or counterpart entities in the U.S. But the most crucial flows that constitute the heart of the binational discourse--the structured and ongoing exchanges of intellectuals with an impact on public life, and of men of affairs (and women in public life) who in turn influence the realm of ideas---are still to a significant extent tended by two Japanese private-sector organizations with blue-ribbon ties to the political, financial, and academic elites in both countries. The International House of Japan (oriented toward scholars, artists and other intellectuals) and the Japan Center for International Exchange (focusing more on parliamentarians and businessmen) both work intimately with the Japan Society of New York. This Tokyo-New York triumvirate functions as something of a binational super-broker, a permanent mutual-admiration nexus that helps to determine--in that critical intellectual/statesman category--who will travel and speak between the two countries, and who will be able to make the American case in Japan.

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On the Japan Lobby
by Robert C. Angel

I have been following the Japan Lobby (what I define as unofficial or non-diplomatic efforts by Japan’s government and private sector to influence the outcomes of U.S. governmental processes) since 1977, the first seven years as a well-placed insider participant. My files (hard copy and electronic) bulge with memoranda of conversations, interviews, press clippings, and writing fragments. I use this information and experience to call attention to Japan’s lobbying efforts whenever possible, usually working through other people and organizations, since I have become known as a “nag” on the subject and therefore have lost credibility in Washington and elsewhere.

I don’t pursue this effort out of spite, or as a vendetta. I do so because I believe that Japan’s national bureaucracy is destroying the U.S.-Japan relationship through its efforts to subvert American governmental processes at the expense of the long-term overall interests of both countries. Nearly all of the Japan Lobby’s energy is directed toward maintenance of the status quo of the political framework through which the U.S.-Japan economic relationship flows. U.S. failure during the post-World War II period to formulate and implement a genuine foreign economic policy has worked to Japan’s economic advantage—as that ‘economic advantage’ or ‘national economic interest’ has been defined by Japan’s mercantilist economic bureaucrats. Japan wants these ideal political conditions to be maintained as long as possible, allowing time for it to ‘catch up,’ to accumulate the clout required for it to assume its proper position in global society, again as defined by the national bureaucracy.

The Japan Lobby therefore struggles most fiercely against efforts to redefine U.S. foreign policy in a way that establishes economic as well as diplo-military interests, including ideas of U.S. industrial policy that naturally involve recognition of international economic objectives. The Japan Lobby has been very successful. Administration after administration has been persuaded through a skillful combination of threat and reward to betray election campaign promises to rationalize U.S. economic relations with Japan. As the job has become more difficult over the years (it will cost much more in the Clinton Administration than it did in the Carter Administration), Japan’s national bureaucracy has devoted more and more money and has employed increasingly sophisticated tactics in pursuit of this simple objective.

I believe public exposure in both the United States and Japan is the best method of countering such efforts -- sunshine as the best disinfectant. This is not easy, however. Such meddling is countered first with offers to buy off the perpetrators, and if that doesn’t work, with a combination of professional and personal character assassination designed to
destroy their credibility and isolate them professionally. Critics are painted as ‘cranks,’ ‘obsessive/compulsives,’ ‘racists,’ and/or covert CIA operatives. Some of the more extreme opponents are even branded ‘revisionists,’ and required to wear the Fuchsia R at all academic conferences.

A fundamental aspect of Japan Lobby strategy has been mobilization of (1) paid, controlled agents, (2) paid cooperator, and (3) unpaid idealistic sympathizers. Like any propaganda operation, the reliability and public credibility of the participants are inversely proportional. It isn’t easy to identify all the players, and once identified, it isn’t easy to categorize them into the above three categories. [For a somewhat different categorization, see Ron Morse’s chart following.] And even when correctly categorized, such information is not readily believed by the American government, communications media, and the public. Many of the category 1 participants remain well hidden or claim category 2 status, and category 2 participants nearly always masquerade as category 3 in order to maintain their respectability and credibility.

Watching these operations over the years, I have found that it is easiest to identify and eventually categorize participants during periods of extreme stress—that is, when Japan’s national bureaucracy believes it faces a real threat to the maintenance of the political status quo. It then quite naturally applies maximum pressure to its paid agents, collaborators, and even unpaid sympathizers for action in opposition to the dreaded changes under consideration. This makes their strategy, tactics, and organization more visible than is ideal, since this sort of work is most effectively done in the dark. With the Clinton administration’s announcement of the 60-day period to reach agreement on current bilateral negotiations, we have entered just such a period.

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The Morse Target: Washington’s Movers and Shakers on Japan by Ronald A. Morse

This is the September 1994 version of Ronald A. Morse’s “Japan Movers and Shakers Target” that identifies the key players shaping American policy toward Japan. It focuses on Washington’s four power centers—(1) the White House and Executive Branch Offices, (2) Capitol Hill and Congress, (3) the “K Street” lobbyists and political activists, and (4) the pamphleteers, policy junkies, and think tanks. The closer a person is to the center of the target, the more critical he or she is of American policy toward Japan; the less critical someone is of the status quo, the closer he or she is to the outer ring. The alphabetical lists of names and organizations give affiliations or further identifications.
“Movers and shakers” are by definition individuals with a commitment to shaping the American political dialogue and agenda on Japan policy. They do this by (1) contributing newspaper articles, appearing on TV and radio programs, lecturing and writing books; (2) by getting political appointments or representing politicians or special interests engaged in the Washington game of influence peddling; or (3) as the army of professional experts--lawyers, engineers, and policy analysts--who monitor and document every detail of the Washington political agenda.

The first “Morse Target” appeared in Venture Japan in 1990 as an effort to get beyond the simplistic categories of Japan “apologist” or “basher.” The target allows one to list a name, position, and area of influence and then see everyone in relation to how tough or easy each is when it comes to his or her comments on Japan.

The years 1990 and 1991 were the peak times for Washington’s concern with Japan. This was the result of several factors--Japanese economic penetration of the U.S. electronics and automobile markets, huge Japanese investments in America, and a sense of economic crisis in the United States concerning its loss of global competitiveness. As a general rule, American concern with Japan rises and falls with the fluctuations in U.S. economic prosperity. In 1992, Americans turned their attention to the presidential elections and the debate over Japan subsided. The election of Bill Clinton--a supporter of exports, industrial policy, and not favorably disposed to Japan--gave all those “movers and shakers” with an ax to grind about Japan great hope. Clinton was initially tough on trade with Japan, but his strategy failed and now he has backed off in defeat. If the U.S. economy slows down again, the Japan issue will heat up once more. As a rule, experts are divided over two things about Japan--the evolution of Japanese intentions and the recommendations for U.S. policy to counter Japan.

There is also one other issue that has become increasingly obvious. Language-competent expertise in the U.S. government on Japan continues to decline. Also, appointments of people with a good knowledge of Japanese society and institutions are few and far between. As younger, professional (in the disciplinary sense of lawyer, economist) people have entered politics or the Washington public policy game, the debate has become theoretical, simplistic, and obviously ineffective. The policy consequences of this for America have yet to be evaluated.

The “Morse Target” presented here contains fewer “real Japan experts” than at any earlier time. And of those experts listed, most have become disenchanted and alienated from Japan. They disagree with Japanese explanations of how issues evolve, and they have lost confidence in the U.S. government’s ability to do anything about it. There is a quality of paralysis about Japan policy in Washington today. In general, the trend over the last few years has been toward a more adversarial posture on U.S.-Japan issues, fewer real experts on Japan, and a lack of respect for or interest in the dynamics driving the Japanese economic and political scene. There is little new thinking about Japan that gets beyond the current gridlock. The big question is how well are American interests served by ignorance, arrogance, and a lack of professionalism?
RONALD A. MORSE is an author and commentator on Japanese affairs, the Director of International Projects at the University of Maryland (College Park), and President of Annapolis International, a consulting firm. He is also a member of the Board of Advisers of the Japan Policy Research Institute.

NOTE: Unfortunately, Ronald Morse’s target cannot be reproduced properly on the Web. For a recent copy of the target, please contact Dr. Morse at rmorse@umdacc.umd.edu

Names and Organizations on the Morse Target

The “K Street” Canyon

American Automobile Manufacturing Association
American Electronics Association
Stanton Anderson, Anderson Hibey Nauheim & Blair
Pat Choate, Manufacturing Policy Project
Lewis Cohen, Si-Wel International
Council on Competitiveness
Bill Duncan, Japan Automobile Mfg. Association
Charles Dyke, Int’l Technology and Trade Association
Gordon Epstein, Mitsubishi International
Tom Gallagher, Lehman Bros.
Maurice Greenberg, CEO, AIG
Joseph Grimes, Samuels International
David Hale, Chief Economist, Kemper Financial
Japan Digest, Fax Newsletter
Bob Keefe, Keefe Co.
Kevin Nealer, Scowcroft Group
Chris Nelson, Teramura International
Robert Orr, Nippon Motorola, Ltd.
Roy Pfautch, Lobbyist
Jody Powell, Powell Tate Co.
Chris Redl, Consultant
Arch Roberts, Capitoline/MS & L
Semiconductor Industry Association
Linda Spencer, Specialty Equipment Market Association
Gary Tooker, CEO, Motorola
US-Japan Business Council
Alan Wolff, Dewey Balantine

The Executive Branch

Charlene Barshefsky, Deputy USTR
Lloyd Bentsen, Secretary of the Treasury
Sandy Berger, Deputy, National Security Council
Ron Brown, Secretary of Commerce  
Bowman Cutter, Deputy, National Economic Council  
James Delaney, Defense Department  
Bob Fauver, Special Asst., Intl. Economic Affairs  
Ken Flamm, DAS, Department of State  
Jeff Garten, Under Sec of Commerce for Intl. Trade  
Tim Geithner, International Affairs, Treasury  
Paul Giarra, Country Director, Japan, Dept. of Defense  
Tom Kalil, National Economic Council  
Mickey Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative  
Holly Kenworthy, State Department  
Michael Kirk, Patent & Trademark Office  
Sandy Kristoff, Asia-Pacific Economic Affairs, NSC  
Ed Lincoln, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo  
Winston Lord, Asst. Secty of State for Asia, Dept. of State  
Walter Mondale, U.S. Ambassador to Japan  
Michael Nacht, Arms Control & Disarmament Agency  
Joe Nye, Department of Defense  
Leon Panetta, White House Chief of Staff  
Bill Reinsch, Under Sec. of Commerce for Export Admn.  
Stan Roth, Director, Asia, National Security Council  
Robert Rubin, Chairman, National Economic Council  
Major Searing, DAS for Japan, Dept. of Commerce  
Wendy Silberman, Dep. Asst. USTR  
Nancy Soderberg, Staff Director, NSC  
Joan Spero, Under Sec. of State for Econ & Agriculture  
Lawrence Summers, Under Sec. of Treasury for Intl Affairs  
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State  
Laura Tyson, Chair, Council of Economic Advisers  
Ezra Vogel, CIA  
Peter Watson, Chair, International Trade Commission  
Bill Wise, Special Assistant, NSC  
Ira Wolf, Deputy Asst. USTR for Japan and China  

*The Media, Think Tanks & Academe*

Arthur Alexander, Japan Economic Institute  
Jim Auer, Vanderbilt University  
Doug Bandow, Cato Institute  
Fred Bergsten, Institute for International Economics  
Clay Chandler, Washington Post  
William Clark, Japan Chair, CSIS  
Steve Clemons, Center for Peace & Freedom/ Richard Nixon Library and Japan Policy Research Institute  
Gerald Curtis, Columbia University  
Ayako Doi, Japan Digest
James Fallows, *Atlantic Monthly*
Tom Friedman, *New York Times*
Glen Fukushima, ACCJ, Tokyo
Eric Gangloff, Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission
Mike Green, Johns Hopkins University, SAIS
Andrew Horvat, Stanford University
Japan Policy Research Institute
Chalmers Johnson, Pres., Japan Policy Research Institute
Robert Kealty, *Wall Street Journal*
Paul Krugman, Department of Economics, MIT
Tovah LaDier, Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs
Bob Manning, Progressive Policy Institute
Mike Mochizuki, Brookings Institute
Edward Olsen, Naval Post Graduate School
George Packard, President, Intl. University of Japan
Hugh Patrick, Columbia University
Clyde Prestowitz, Economic Strategy Institute
Jim Przystup, Asian Studies, Heritage Foundation
Renaissance Club
Tom Reid, *Washington Post*
Hobart Rowen, *Washington Post*
Richard Samuels, Japan Technology Program, MIT
Jeff Shear, *National Journal*
Bruce Stokes, *National Journal*
Marjorie Sun, National Public Radio
Alan Tonelson, Economic Strategy Institute
Lester Thurow, MIT
Karel van Wolferen, writer
Karl Zinsmeister, AEI

**Capitol Hill**

Neil Abercrombie (D, Hawaii)
Gary Ackerman (D, New York)
David Asher, Fellow, Institute for Defense Analyses
Thelma Askey, House Ways & Means, Trade Subcmte.
Max Baucus (D, Montana)
Howard Berman (D, California)
Jeff Bingaman (D, New Mexico)
Daniel Bob, staff member, Senator William Roth
Bill Bradley (D, New Jersey)
Richard Bush, House Foreign Affairs Committee
Robin Cleveland, staff member, Senate Appropriations
Bill Cooper, Congressional Research Service
Rick Finn, Senate Armed Services Committee
Tom Foley (D, Washington)
Sam Gejdenson (D, Connecticut)
Richard Gephardt (D, Missouri)
GLOBE, Global Legislators for a Balanced Environment
Lee Hamilton (D, Indiana)
Jim Kolbe (R, Arizona)
Robert Kerry (D, Nebraska)
Robert Matsui (D, California)
Edward McGaffigan, staff member, Senator Bingaman
Glenn McLoughlin, Congressional Research Service
Allan Mendelowitz, General Accounting Office
Dick Nanto, Congressional Research Service
Doug Olin, Senate Budget Committee
Bill Richardson (D, New Mexico)
Jay Rockefeller (D, West Virginia)
Charles Robb (D, Virginia)
William Roth (R, Virginia)
Robert Tompkin, Democratic Study Group
David Weiner, House Foreign Affairs Committee
Bruce Wilson, staff member, Office of Sam Gibbons
Peter Yeo, House Foreign Affairs Committee